



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 NUMBER 7

## Asia and the U.S.: For Mutual Understanding

by Robert Blum

With a zeal that reflects the desire of Americans to understand and be understood by Asians, some 1,500 participants in the Sixth National Conference of the United States National Commission for UNESCO developed many specific recommendations for individual and group action in this country to promote mutual understanding between Asia and the United States.

The formal title of the conference, held in San Francisco November 6-9, was "Asia and the United States: What the American Citizen Can Do to Promote Mutual Understanding and Cooperation." The conference was planned as an American contribution to the major UNESCO project, "Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values," adopted at the UNESCO General Conference in New Delhi a year ago.

In general, the emphasis of the major addresses as well as in the section and work group meetings was on the importance and necessity of greater efforts in the United States to learn more about Asia, to take a more sympathetic attitude toward its problems and to improve appreciation of its culture. Less attention was paid to the desirability of assisting

in the preservation and strengthening of free institutions in that area of the world.

Although there was perhaps too much self-criticism among the American delegates over the inadequacy of our efforts to date, there was some recognition that a one-sided American effort to understand Asia would be unlikely to succeed and that Asians must make comparable efforts to understand this country. If our effort is too one-sided its motives may be suspect and it may invite contempt rather than encourage understanding. To avoid this danger, a degree of frankness not hitherto attained is necessary, and it is important for both sides to refrain from recrimination, preaching and self-deprecation.

Occasionally during the conference apologies for American behavior and attitudes were accompanied by a tendency to romanticize conditions in Asia by attributing to Asians an idealism and sense of constructive purpose exceeding those of the West. The West was castigated by some of the Asian participants for its alleged stubborn refusal to appreciate the new Asia and its perpetuation of backward concepts about Asia at a time when that area is moving ahead.

DECEMBER 15, 1957

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED  
345 EAST 46TH STREET • NEW YORK 17, NEW YORK

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG  
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This picture can hardly sustain objective analysis. A more judicious appraisal of the true situation in both Asia and the West would seem to be more conducive to a frank relationship if it were based on a reciprocal attempt at mutual understanding and a frank recognition of points of difference as well as similarities. In such a process Asians as well as the Americans have responsibilities, and it would seem timely for some of the Asian countries to consider holding conferences of Asians, comparable to the San Francisco meeting, to discuss ways in which they can promote mutual cooperation and understanding with the West.

There is also a role to be played by Europe, which mothered our own civilization and gave to many of the countries of Asia their experience with the West. Even those countries that have rejected European colonial rule have retained important cultural, social and political concepts and institutions borrowed from the West, particularly Europe, and they will not wish or be able to cast them off as long as they seek to modernize and achieve an important place among the nations. Thus, as the countries of Europe and Asia discard their preoccupations with the colonial legacy, there should be enhanced opportunity for nourishing the interchange between Asia and the West for the mutual enrichment of all. The Europeans have yet to show that they fully appreciate these opportunities.

In the United States, where much energy goes into a program such as

the San Francisco conference and the follow-up work that will undoubtedly be undertaken by the numerous interested organizations, not very much systematic thought has been given to the precise purposes that will be served by efforts of the kind contemplated. This program includes a great variety of activities in education, communications, research and cooperation as applied to the fields of language, philosophy, religion, science, student and teacher exchange, the creative arts and economics.

### What Does U.S. Hope For?

What is it that we hope and expect to accomplish by these efforts? Is the "understanding" that we seek one that is primarily spiritual and intellectual, or do we expect these ties to bind us closer politically? The shadow of political struggle hangs so heavily on all of us that there is a risk it may obscure the great purpose of enriching our civilization and our individual lives by learning eagerly from others and sharing our own knowledge with humility. To think primarily of the political results may lead to bitter disappointment and frustration.

In any case, the San Francisco conference properly served to focus attention on America's responsibilities to promote mutual understanding. A number of distinguished Americans and Asians provided keynote speeches, encouragement or candid warnings that a strong effort must be made to remove present misunderstandings. The plenary conference

was addressed by the Under Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter; the director-general of UNESCO, Luther H. Evans; the president of the Ford Foundation, Henry T. Heald; the chairman of the executive board of UNESCO, Dr. Vittorino Veronese; the under secretary of the United Nations, Ahmed Bokhari; vice-president of the AFL-CIO, Walter P. Reuther; and former president of the United Nations General Assembly, Madame V. L. Pandit, presently Indian high commissioner in London. The ambassador of Burma to the United Nations and the ambassador of Malaya in Washington also delivered addresses to luncheon meetings.

When the four-day conference ended, Asian observers and American delegates representing civic, professional, academic and other groups left San Francisco with a better understanding of the problem of developing mutual understanding and a healthy respect for the magnitude of the task ahead. Smaller conferences, more limited as to subject matter or area, will be needed in the months to come to carry the benefits of this meeting to state and local levels.

Dr. Blum, president of The Asia Foundation since 1953, was on the faculty of Yale University 1936-41. Subsequently he served as assistant to the late Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and as chief of the Overseas Territories Division of the ECA mission to France and the ECA mission to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. A full report of the San Francisco conference will be issued in 1958. In the meantime, those interested in reading the work papers and preliminary reports of conference discussions may obtain copies from the UNESCO Relations Staff, Department of State.

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: JOHN S. BADEAU • BENJAMIN J. BUITENWIESER • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • BROOKS EMENY • AUGUST HECKSCHER • MRS. W. HOUSTON KENYON, JR. • MARGARET PARTON • STEPHEN H. STACKPOLE • ANNA LORD STRAUSS. JOHN W. NASON, President; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor; NEAL STANFORD, Washington Contributor; FELICE SOLOMON, Assistant Editor. • *The Foreign Policy Association contributes to the public understanding by presenting a cross-section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors.* • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. RE-ENTERED AS SECOND-CLASS MATTER SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N.Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

347

*Produced under union conditions and composed, printed and bound by union labor.*





## Next Step in U.S. Foreign Policy

The need for a United States foreign policy to fit the age of the sputnik seems obvious. But it is one thing to admit something is necessary and quite another to do anything about it—or even to know what to do about it.

The trouble is the task is so immense, the imponderables so numerous, the danger so grave, the alternatives so varied, that to do anything basically different calls for daring decisions that make even the bravest waver. But the fact remains that 19th-century foreign policy cannot meet 20th-century foreign policy problems, that missile-age crises cannot be met by motor-age solutions, that the sputnik era requires sputnik answers.

Also, you cannot turn a foreign policy around on a dime—whether in time or space. There has to be months of exploring all possible policies. There has to be formulation of specific actions. There has to be education of the public and Congress. There has to be drive, grasp, leadership.

Any new foreign policy should also be a united Administration policy; should have bipartisan understanding and acceptance; should have free-world agreement and appreciation. Also any such policy should not be sectional, regional, partial. Like a jigsaw puzzle the parts dealing with each area of the world have to fit together.

Fortunately, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles is aware of all this and has started that agonizing reappraisal which must bear fruit or presage disaster. He is openly preaching “interdependence” of free-world nations. He is publicly calling for

modified concepts of sovereignty. He is earnestly practicing bipartisanship in policy planning.

The other day Mr. Dulles called in a group of old Truman advisers to get their thoughts on remodelling NATO. More recently the Administration approached the titular leader of the Democratic party, Adlai E. Stevenson, to get his help. But there is a lot of brain power and experience untapped. Former President Truman's views could be requested or requisitioned. So could those of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson or of former policy planning chief, George F. Kennan. And it would be wise and helpful for Mr. Dulles to pick the brains of such pundits as Walter Lippmann, Roscoe Drummond, Joseph and Stewart Alsop and James Reston, who are no amateurs at deep thinking.

### What About 'Summit' Talks?

The President's “chins up” speeches indicated he is aware that the rocket age is here to stay; also that something has to be done about it. But it is no mean trick to be reassuring and ominous in the same breath. So far his comments have dealt more with domestic ways of adjusting to the new era than with necessary shifts in foreign policy. But there are plenty of foreign policy matters that need a new look, revision or even reversal.

Take the matter of “summit” talks. The Kremlin is angling for such, openly, blatantly—preferably bilateral talks. Some United States politicians are urging the White House to go ahead; so are some of our allies. So far, however, Eisenhower and Dulles frown on such talks, believing the Western alliance would

collapse if the United States and the U.S.S.R. ever met at the summit. Some of their aides say, Wait until we get ahead again with sputniks.

There is the question of Germany. Should the United States stand on its policy of free elections before unification or should it weigh the wisdom of a neutralized Germany? And what does any German policy do to NATO solidarity and effectiveness? Then there is the issue of disarmament, of nuclear tests, of aerial inspection. It is just possible sputnik has changed the premises on which our disarmament policy is resting—just as our original atomic-control proposals were quickly outmoded.

There are also questions to be resolved with our allies—with NATO, Latin America, SEATO and the Baghdad pact nations. Has the Eisenhower Doctrine outlived its usefulness or fulfilled its purposes? Is it possible to keep peace in the Middle East by holding to the fiction that the U.S.S.R. is not in there in fact? Then there is the hoary question of Formosa. Should, must, the United States go on recognizing Chiang Kai-shek as the ruler of all China yet forbidding him to try to get control of all China? And how can the dozen or so defense arrangements to which the United States is a party be correlated?

No one is underestimating the size of the task facing Mr. Dulles and his colleagues. No one can honestly say that the Secretary is not grappling with the problem. But what makes his task particularly frustrating is that our foreign policy must be made to fit an era which has yet to be really unveiled.

NEAL STANFORD



## Negotiations With Russia: Good or Bad?

*(The author here discusses the proposals of 155 Soviet scientists, who have urged the holding of "a broad international conference of scientists" to discuss "proposals directed toward the prevention of atomic war." Dr. Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has sent out a special bulletin containing the Soviet communications. Last summer Mr. Eaton invited Soviet, British and American scientists to confer together at his summer home at Pugwash, Nova Scotia.)*

**T**HERE WILL be no solution, no road to peace, as long as nobody will trust anyone else, as long as one side is trying to bamboozle the other. At Pugwash none of that existed. Each scientist there believed what the other scientists were saying. And in a sense they couldn't fool each other—they were all men with the widest knowledge of atomic energy and of the hydrogen bomb. I didn't see a single instance where one man was trying to put something over on someone else. They were trying to deal with facts, not with illusions and prejudices.

Everyone warned in advance that the Russians would never go along. But after a day all of us were convinced that the Russians were being completely honest, completely frank. Therefore, it made for a remarkable community where the cards were all on the table, where everyone was aboveboard with everyone else.

I realize there are people who would say I was deceived, taken in. Others would say the whole thing was gotten up to put over a Russian scheme. The Russians had nothing

to do with getting the party up. I think, in fact, they approached it with some caution.

The Russian today, whether he's dealing with pure or applied science, is the equal of anyone else in the world. When these scientists were in Pugwash this summer, I took friends of mine from the Western countries aside and said: "Is there anything that our top scientists know about nuclear warfare, about the power of the atom, that they don't know? Is there *anything* we have that they don't?" They said: "They have everything we have, and more."

The Russians sent a delegation of farmers to America—I'm a farmer as well as an industrialist—and one of the Russian shortcomings is in good beef cattle. I gave them a pure-bred shorthorn beef bull (I have the grand champion of the world in that beef breed). They thought that was a gesture of friendship, perhaps. Shortly afterward a delegation of Russian journalists came to the United States and they asked the State Department if they could spend a day with me. The State Department arranged it, and they did. They were unusually competent men, bright, friendly. . . .

When Pugwash came along, I asked the Russians to send over some of their leading scientists, and they responded.

I don't suppose you'd find any one in the world more dedicated to capitalism and democracy than I am. But I think the best way to destroy these two institutions in America is to go to war with Russia.

The longer we put off finding a common ground the tougher it's go-

ing to be to find. Russia has tremendous resources, and her people have a great willingness to work and a strong love of country.

Leave Russia alone, let her deal with her economic theories and practices—time would have a big effect on these. But to build places all around them from which we can launch bombs and missiles gives that nation a solidarity that it would not have if they didn't feel the Western world was plotting to destroy them.

So I take the declaration of these 155 top scientists seriously. I think that any man who refuses to respond to that approach is lacking in wisdom and not serving the best interests of the United States.

### Live Together or Perish

I think the more contact we have between people of the two nations the quicker we'll realize we are all human, with weaknesses, with limitations, and that for better or for worse we had better agree not to annihilate each other. Either we'll live together or we'll perish together. I'd like to see constant exchanges between scientists, educators, artists, people of the two countries.

We're faced with a condition, whether we like it or not, in which Russia has all the instruments of modern war, and it just doesn't make sense to continue that kind of an armaments contest. This is the time for anyone who feels this way to speak up.

I think you'll find the average businessman, connected with industry, realizes as keenly as I do that World War III would be the de-

*(Continued on page 54)*

### 'Let's Meet the Soviets Half-Way'

by Cyrus S. Eaton

Mr. Eaton heads the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, West Kentucky Coal, Steep Rock Iron Mines and Portsmouth Steel. He is a trustee of the University of Chicago, Denison University and Case Institute of Technology. This article is reproduced with permission of the New York *Herald-Tribune*, in which it was copyrighted on November 8, and of the author.

## 'Don't Believe the Russians'

by Eugene S. Duffield

Mr. Duffield is vice-president of the Federated Department Stores, Inc. in Cincinnati. From 1942-46 he was assistant to the late James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, following 11 years as a Washington newspaper correspondent. This letter to the editor of *The Wall Street Journal* is reproduced with the permission of that newspaper and of the author.

**W**E ARE on the eve of what may be a great shift in the military balance of power. We now have concrete evidence that we are, or may soon become, militarily inferior to Russia. There are four reasons:

1. We always have been outnumbered in total numbers.

2. We probably are checkmated on the power of atomic weapons. The Russian supply may be smaller than ours, but it probably is big enough to do the job.

3. What became clear October 4 and 5, 1957 is that the Russians have, or soon can have, the superior intercontinental striking force. From World War II until now our Strategic Air Command of manned bombers was the superior striking force. Now, or soon, Russian ICBM's can become the superior striking force. Russian rocket superiority, demonstrated by the satellite, is not a sudden freak; for years they have developed much higher thrust by jets and rockets than we. Our failure to launch a heavy satellite is some evidence of Russian superiority. Of even greater importance are the results of our own attempts to launch military ICBM's which (as far as the public has been allowed to know) have been abortive.

### U.S. Out-Produced

4. It is obvious now that we have been out-researched and out-produced. How the Russians did this is also obvious. What they needed to overmatch us militarily was, first, atomic weapons and, second, an intercontinental striking force. They long ago achieved the atomic weap-

ons by forced draft. To create the striking force they took a bold and double gamble. To give themselves time they gambled on our unwillingness ever to use our superior striking force, hedging this bet somewhat with an excellent defensive air force. Then they leaped clear over the era of manned aircraft and, while we were spending money, time and resources on B36's, B47's, and B52's, they went directly to missiles for their striking force.

### Another Pearl Harbor?

The cumulative effect of a superior Russian striking force, added to their atomic stockpile and their manpower, will mark one of the great swings of military power in the history of the world. It is comparable to what happened to Britain and France in Europe during 1933-40 with the rise of Hitler's *Wehrmacht* and *Luftwaffe*. It is comparable to what happened to us in the Pacific on December 7, 1941.

This appraisal is based on the situation as of today and will remain realistic unless, or until, new fundamental developments occur. To swing the balance back we need to develop an intercontinental missile striking force at least equal in quantity and quality to the Russian force, checkmating them here as they checkmated us on atomic weapons.

Our allies, and through them we, face a series of diplomatic extortions and cold war defeats exacted from us at the gun point of superior military force. These events will resemble what happened to Britain and France from Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland to Poland and to us

from Japan's Shanghai incident to Pearl Harbor. (Egypt-Syria could be the Austria; Turkey and the Middle East could be the Czechoslovakia; North Africa, the Balkans and perhaps West Germany, the Poland.) The Russians' postwar tactics indicate that they will prefer this approach, at least at first. However, there is sure to be a group in Russia who will urge the Pearl Harbor technique, destroying the United States first and picking up the rest of the world like a pawn.

The effect of the cold-war reversals will be to swing the balance of power farther and farther against us, making our ultimate resistance, when it comes, more difficult. This course is the traditional one of peace-loving democracies faced by dictatorships willing to risk war for aggrandizement.

For example, the effects of a Russian Middle East-North African coup would be to deprive us of our Middle East and Mediterranean bases, to advance Russian bases that much closer to our homeland, to deprive us of Middle Eastern fuel resources and of the Eurasian-African land bridge, and to begin the encirclement of Europe on the South.

Like Hitler and Japan, Russia will accompany its series of extortions by protestations of peace or coexistence. There are two reasons for not believing them.

The Communist doctrine of world rule is still Russian policy.

The Russian record of disarmament since 1946 is the same as Hitler's and Japan's—engaging us in fruitless negotiations while they advance from inferiority to superiority—and it has the same purpose, to confuse us and emasculate our efforts to defend ourselves.

Hopes that the Communist dictatorship will somehow disappear can now be dismissed. Dictatorships,

(Continued on page 54)

## Eaton

(Continued from page 52)

struction of mankind.

This is the great time for people to speak up, and those can speak most effectively who can't be suspected of susceptibility to a bribe or to flattery. It's an awful reflection on our country to suggest that if we mix freely with the Russians we'll abdicate everything we believe in, everything we stand for. . . .

### What Should Be Our Answer?

What should be the mechanics of our answer to the Soviet proposal? This depends on the scale, on whether a few scientists or a large group will be involved. Perhaps we'd have to have it under the auspices of a government, but this inevitably carries a stigma with it. We can't hold it in the United States because the United States won't allow representatives from Red China. This is a policy — like barring newsmen to China — in which it's hard to find any intelligence. It's a madness that suggests a lack of wisdom in our handling of these fateful problems.

It would probably be held in Canada, the West Indies or India. The Chinese, Russians, Poles, Slavs are all willing to go to Canada, and that perhaps is the place to have it.

All indicates a willingness on the part of scientists to do their part toward cooling the passions of statesmen.

I think the more conferences we have under as many auspices as possible, taking in people with no axe to grind—and scientists are probably as disinterested as you can find—the better.

It's certainly something colleges and universities can back. Certainly anyone who is a capitalist ought to go for it—because in a war all the material accumulations of the past would go. One hydrogen bomb would lay this great city in rubble.

Never before have the penalties of folly been so great.

We need a spell of humility. To us, one of the most sobering thoughts must be that all the men who produced the first atomic bomb were not Americans—they were Italians, Danes, Poles, Germans. How could we have persuaded ourselves no other nation would ever devise one—when, while it was created on United States soil, it was created by *brains* from other parts of the world?

We're suffering from the great success we had in World War I and World War II. We've convinced ourselves we were invincible, that we were the darlings of the gods. We ought to stop boasting about ourselves and stop maligning other people, whether Chinese or Russian.

## Duffield

(Continued from page 53)

producing the kind of world-impressing successes that now lie before the Russians, do not fade away or blow up internally. Conversely, because of the domestic popularity to be gained, the Russian dictatorship will not be able to resist the temptation of adventures.

There are now two courses open to our government.

### Economic Mobilization Needed

First, it can order an immediate emergency program to try to overcome the Russian missile lead. This

would require a reversal of current budgetary, economic and military policies and might require some degree of economic mobilization because our economy seems already fully employed.

The more probable course is one of business as usual such as the government of Great Britain followed in the 30's under Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain. This course is consistent with the recent attitude in both Congress and the Administration and is typical of democracies in the first stages of peril. Ultimately, it will have to be discarded, when cold war defeats have produced some future Munich.

Thus, both courses lead to the same result: economic mobilization. One course does so soon and gradually; the other, later and with desperation. The timing will be determined as much in Moscow as here.

The general effects on business of economic mobilization are familiar. They are budgetary deficits despite higher taxation, monetary or credit inflation with easy money, scarcity of commodities with rising prices, manpower shortages with rising wages and efforts at direct economic controls by allocation, price-wage regulation, manpower mobilization.

An emerging military superiority of Russia will require us to accept all of these evils if we are to avoid the supreme evil of subjugation as a nation.

## Through Understanding to Peace on Earth

Give the Christmas Gift of Understanding—an FPA membership, which includes the *Bulletin* and *Headline Series*. Enclosed find \$..... for FPA Gifts and Cards for (Please print) .....

Regular Membership	\$6	Type of Gift .....
Cooperating "	\$10	(List additional gifts on separate sheet)
<i>Bulletin</i> subscription only,	\$4	From .....
<i>Headline Series</i> " "	\$2	.....





## The Tragedy of Algeria

Americans have been so busy since October 4 listening for the "beep" of Sputniks I and II that little heed has been paid to the ticking of a time bomb increasingly dangerous for the West: the time bomb of France's struggle to preserve Algeria, across the Mediterranean in North Africa, as an "integral" part of its territory.

### NATO Dilemma

The disastrous potential of the persisting Algerian crisis not only for the French but for the future of the Western alliance was dramatically revealed by the clash between France on the one hand, the United States and Britain on the other, about the dispatch of a small quantity of Anglo-American arms to Tunisia, a former French protectorate bordering on Algeria. This clash threw a blinding light on the dilemma faced by the NATO allies. The Western nations agree on the need for united defense action against Russia in the North Atlantic area, although they differ as to the military form this action should take in the sputnik age. But they find themselves at odds, again and again, about policy toward the areas outside the European continent where they have special interests: Britain in Cyprus, France in Algeria, the French and British in other remaining African possessions, Portugal in the one Western colony left on the territory of India—Goa.

This dilemma has been inherent in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from the moment of its creation in 1949 as an offset to the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the prospect of aggression by the U.S.S.R. It can be summed up as follows: Is NATO designed to defend the Atlantic area against Russia

or is it to be used at the same time to defend territories outside Europe against nationalist movements for independence?

### How France Sees It

The French have answered this question emphatically in the affirmative. They have withdrawn from Europe four of their five divisions assigned to the NATO forces and have used them in Algeria to fight the rebels. They have also used equipment provided to the NATO forces by the United States. Their argument is that since Algeria is an "integral" part of France and is specifically included in the area covered by the NATO alliance, they have the right to make use of men and arms they had placed under NATO.

The French also contend that the Algerian rebels are equipped with arms smuggled to them from Egypt through Tunisia, whose independence France recognized in 1956; that Egypt received these arms from the Soviet bloc; and that the Algerian struggle is thus part of the common Western struggle against Russia and international communism. From the French point of view, the Arab states of the Middle East, which sympathize with and support the Algerian rebels, are enemies, not only of France, but of the West as a whole.

The position of the United States and Britain is much less clear-cut. A year ago the British agreed with the French in denouncing Egypt as the villain of the piece, not only in the Middle East, but also in Africa, and joined them in staging the attack on Suez in the hope of ousting Nasser and thus eradicating the root of the trouble. Britain, however, has retained ties in the Middle East

through Iraq, a fellow member of the Baghdad pact, and has no desire to withdraw from the territories it still holds on the Persian Gulf. It now apparently agrees with the United States on the need of maintaining and developing relations with Muslim peoples friendly to the West—notably Tunisia, whose president, Habib Bourguiba, in spite of the ill-treatment he had received from the French before independence, has repeatedly proclaimed his support of Western democracy. And the United States, taking heed of its diplomatic setbacks in Egypt and Syria, is determined, in Tunisia, to close the door to Russian penetration through arms aid before Bourguiba becomes disaffected by Western inaction.

### U.S. and British Views

Judging by the press-conference statements of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on November 19, the United States and Britain, having reached the conclusion that Bourguiba should be provided with arms to maintain his country's internal security, hoped until the zero hour they had set for delivery that France would supply such arms on conditions acceptable to Tunisia. France, however, wanted ironclad guarantees that these arms, if delivered, would not somehow find their way to Algeria. Bourguiba did not supply the required guarantees—and France's allies, in what appeared to be an emergency atmosphere, flew arms from Libya to Tunis on November 14. According to published reports the shipments included 500 M-1 rifles and 50,000 rounds of ammunition from the United States and 350 Sterling submachine guns and 70 Bren guns with ammunition for both

types of weapons from Britain. The news of these shipments provoked a violent explosion of resentment from the French public and official protests from France's new Radical premier, Felix Gaillard, and his foreign minister, M. Pineau, who flew to Washington to talk with Mr. Dulles.

## Two Main Issues

While Franco-American negotiations may gradually reduce the tensions aroused by the Tunisian incident, two main issues remain unresolved.

First, Is it wise, over the long run, for the United States, with or without the cooperation of Britain, to compete with Russia in giving or selling arms to countries of the Middle East and North Africa? The Administration has made it clear that it believes this is necessary in order to avert the possibility that these countries would otherwise seek arms from Russia, which would thus acquire a foothold on their soil. There is a danger, however, that the resulting arms race between the great powers may aggravate rather than ease existing conflicts, and that when it comes to a showdown the arms supplied by the West may be used, not against Russia, but in the Middle East against Israel, or in North Africa against France. The danger of such a development has caused some

American observers to ask whether it would not be wiser for the United States to consider, together with Russia, the possibility of an arms embargo in this explosive area.

The second question is whether, in token of its gratitude for arms aid from the West, Bourguiba, in cooperation with King Mohamed V of Morocco, whom he visited on November 20-22, will actively promote a settlement of the Algerian crisis. During their visit in Rabat, the two North African leaders addressed an "urgent appeal" to the French and Algerians for negotiations to end the three-year guerrilla war, which has taken a toll of 40,000 lives and produced 80,000 refugees, many of them now on Tunisian soil. Offering their good offices, they said that the negotiations "should achieve a just solution, leading to recognition of the sovereignty of the Algerian people in conformity with the principles of the United Nations" and "safeguarding the interests of France and French nationals."

By substituting the term "sovereignty" for "independence," which the French have so far officially rejected in the case of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco have indicated their understanding of French sensitivities. But they still call for negotiations with the Algerian National Liberation Front, the principal rebel organization, with whom the French

have hitherto refused to talk in advance of a cease-fire.

France's initial response to the Tunisian-Moroccan appeal, made on the eve of resumption of United Nations discussion of Algeria, was cool. There are increasing signs, however, that many nonofficial Frenchmen are eager to find a formula for the settlement of a war which is draining France's financial resources and jeopardizing its role in Europe and Africa. The French also realize more and more that their costly but so far unsuccessful efforts to stamp out the Algerian rebellion have created a grave moral problem for a democratic nation. This was shown by the vote favoring negotiations at the congress of the Radical party, where former Premier Mendes-France challenged the government of Premier Gaillard. France's ruthless suppression measures reported by the well-known journalist Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, editor of the weekly *L'Express*, in his recently published book, *Lieutenant in Algeria* (New York, Knopf) have shocked French consciences as nothing had done since World War II. And many agree with Servan-Schreiber that "the revolt against the vicious circle of violence and the temptation to use brute force," which he witnessed during his army service, gives promise of a solution worthy of France.

VERA MICHELES-DEAN

## FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.

### In this issue:

Asia and the U.S.: For Mutual Understanding—	
R. Blum .....	49
Next Step in U.S. Foreign Policy—N. Stanford ..	51
Negotiations With Russia: Good or Bad?—	
C. S. Eaton .....	52
E. S. Duffield .....	53
The Tragedy of Algeria—V. M. Dean .....	55

### In the next issue:

A Foreign Policy Report—	
The Philippine Elections: New Trends,	
by David Wurfel	

BETHANY COLLEGE LIBR.  
BETHANY  
W. VA.

LS-11